The influence of competition level on referees' decision making was investigated.
or bias decision making (Plessner & Haar, 2006) . Such cognitive shortcuts include the color of players' shirt (Frank & Gillovich, 1988) , the passage of the game (e.g., Unkelbach & Memmert, 2008) , the noise of the crowd (e.g., Nevill, Balmer, & Williams, 2002) , or the players' aggressive reputation (Jones, Paull, & Erskine, 2002) .
There is increasing evidence that referees also use stereotypes -defined here as beliefs and associations individuals develop toward members of social categories (e.g., Schneider, 2004 ) -to guide decisions. For example, referees tend to develop expectations that female players are less skillful and aggressive than male players, and when faced with very similar situations involving male or female players, referees at different levels of expertise sanction female players more than male players (Souchon et al., 2013) . In the present research, we aimed to extend this literature by testing whether referees' decisions differ as a function of competition level, and how these relate to stereotypes of player competence at different levels of competition (Souchon et al., 2009 ).
Stereotyping and competition levels
According to the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) , two basics dimensions -competence and warmth -underlie the content of stereotypes. The dimension of competence is dependent on perceived group status, with high-status groups being stereotyped as competent. In contrast, competitive groups are stereotyped as lacking warmth. The model predicts that individuals are more likely to help member of low-status groups stereotyped as warm, and be less helpful toward more competitive groups stereotyped as cold (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008) .
As status in sport is defined in large part through competition level, referees may perceive high-level players to be "competent" (e.g., skillful) and "cold" (e.g., aggressive, argumentative, dishonest), relative to lower-level players (see for example Conroy, Silva, Newcomer, Walker, and Johnson, 2001 on the relation between level and perception of legitimacy of dangerous actions). Consequently, referees may be less helpful or benevolent toward high-level players than low-level players. Evidence consistent with this comes from analyses of referees' stereotypes based on player gender (Souchon et al., 2013) .
Overall, the SMC would predict that referees are harsher toward highest-level players, such that physical contact between players would need to be severe before referees would feel the need to stop the game or return back the ball to the attacking players. Moreover, stereotypes guide cognitive interpretation of ambiguous information in order to confirm stereotype expectations (e.g., Darley & Gross, 1983) . If referees perceive high-level players to be highly skillful, they may also anticipate that a player in possession of the ball could continue his or her action despite being victim of several fouls under the advantage rule (i.e., allowing the game to continue without intervention).
Accordingly, a recent study revealed that referees punished transgressions by highestlevel players less severely with sporting and disciplinary sanctions than those made by lowestlevel players (Souchon et al., 2009 and Fontayne (in press) found using archival data (i.e, without directly observing players' aggressive behaviors) that referees actually gave more disciplinary punishment to male handball players at the European level of competition than lower levels, in contrast to 
Conditions under which referees apply stereotypes of players
Handball players on the attacking team have to develop a collective strategy to create free space within the defensive team. During these phases of organised attack, the player in possession of the ball may be victim of one or several illegal actions from the defensive team (e.g., being pushed) and be consequently be blocked, miss their pass or shot, or carry on to be successful in their pass or shot despite the transgression.
Under the advantage rule, referees in situations in which the attacking player could be blocked have to determine if they should let the play continue or intervene. As these situations are ambiguous, referees may consciously or unconsciously apply stereotypes. For example, Souchon et al. (2010) found that referees at an intermediate level intervened immediately more often for female players than male players, and suggested that this may have been because referees applied their gender stereotypes related to sporting skill (i.e., that female players are less able to successfully continue after a transgression). Concerning the effect of competition level on decisions, we expected in the present study that referees would tend to intervene sooner with lower-level players than with higherlevel players. This is because referees are likely to regard players at the highest level to be more able to continue after a transgression than at lower levels (Souchon et al., 2009 ). Souchon et al. (2010) also suggest that two different scenarios can arise if the referee does not intervene immediately after a transgression: the attacking player is successful or unsuccessful in his or her pass or shot. In theory, referees should not intervene if the attacking team gains an advantage. Consequently, the first scenario presents no ambiguity and means that referees have less need to apply their stereotype. In these cases, there should be no effect of competition level or gender on referees' decisions. Consistent with this, Souchon et al. (2010) found no effect of player gender on male referees' decisions in such "successful situations", and intervention was very rare for both genders.
In contrast, referees' stereotypes may be more relevant when the attacking player is unsuccessful. Observations (Souchon et al., 2010) and experiments (Souchon et al., 2013) revealed that referees in unsuccessful situations tend to be more benevolent toward female players, giving back the ball more frequently to female players than male players, and explaining this in terms of stereotypical expectations. Similarly, referees might be more benevolent toward low-level than higher-level players. We therefore expected that referees would intervene more frequently at the lowest than at the highest levels. Moreover, referees would explain this tendency in terms of competence stereotypes of the players.
Effects on Disciplinary Sanctions
Concerning disciplinary sanctions, Souchon et al. (2010) found a player gender effect in situations that involved a "failure" (i.e., immediate intervention or unsuccessful situations), but not a "success". These former situations may be perceived to be more dangerous by referees, who are subsequently more likely to apply their stereotypes when making disciplinary decisions. For example, Souchon et al. (2013) found experimentally that referees tended to punish female player more severely than male players in failure situations (see also Souchon, Coulomb-Cabagno, Traclet, & Rascle, 2004) . Concerning the influence of competition level, observational data have so far been mixed, indicating either that referees punished aggressive players with disciplinary sanctions less (Souchon et al., 2009 ) or more (Debanne & Fontayne, in press) at the highest competition level than at the intermediate competition level.
Summary, aims and predictions
The aims of the present research were to extend the approach of Souchon et al. (2009) and Debanne and Fonatyne (in press) by examining the effect of competition level on referees' decisions, and the extent to which referees explain such decisions in terms of competition-level stereotypes. Based on the SCM, we predicted that for similar situations, referees would intervene less frequently with sporting sanctions with higher-level players than with lower-level players, based on the former's perceived ability to make use of the advantage rule (i.e., the high competence component of the stereotype). However, for disciplinary sanctions, it may be that referees are actually more severe with higher-level players, due to the concurrent stereotype of these players as being aggressive and competitive (i.e., the low warmth component of the stereotype). 
Method

Procedure
The "attacking team" is defined as the team in possession of the ball. Handball referees can return the ball to the attacking team through a sporting sanction when at least one defensive opponent displays a transgression (International Handball Federation, 2005) .
Nonetheless, referees must not intervene according to the advantage rule before the player has lost possession of the ball or cannot pursue their actions because of the transgression (IHF, 2005, Rule 13.2). We therefore focused our observations on transgressions committed against players in possession of the ball.
Our observations also centred on what we define as 'organized attack' situations, in which a player in possession finds himself or herself behind a line of at least four opposing defenders. This is based on a pilot sample and previous research (Souchon et al., 2004) which indicated that handball referees perceive such attacks to comprise the main part of handball games, and to be more physically and technically demanding than counter attacks. They are thus the best situations to observe the application of the advantage rule. Attackers' fouls were not measured due to their shortage.
Players' transgressions. Observation criteria for identifying transgressions strictly
followed the rules of handball. These include any 'pushing', 'bumping into', 'pushing away' 'holding back', 'catching and holding', or 'seizing the player with possession around the waist' (rule 8.2, IHF, 2005). Multiple transgressions were recorded when a player in possession was victim of two or more transgressions before passing the ball or shooting.
Handball refereeing decisions.
For each observed transgression, we recorded referees' decisions: i.e., sporting (9-m throw vs. 7-m throw: direct shot at the goal) and/or disciplinary sanctions (yellow card vs. 2-min suspension vs. red card). Advantage rule application was inferred from a referee's decision not to sanction an observed transgression.
Type of situations. Immediate intervention situations, unsuccessful situations, and successful situations were observed as in Souchon et al. (2010) . In immediate intervention situations, the referee intervened instantaneously following the defensive transgression. In unsuccessful situations, the player missed a pass or shot after the defensive transgression. In successful situations, the player accomplished a pass or shot, despite the defensive transgression.
Coding
Before undertaking our final observations, one game for each level in the male championship and in the female championship were observed by three people, including two handball experts (M age = 40 years, M Experience = 12 years officiating at the highest national level), and the main author. Two other games were observed two weeks later by the main author. The Kappa coefficients (i.e., agreed inter-observer and intra-observer coefficient) between 0.85 and 0.95 were satisfactory. Each game was then observed by the main author and one of the two handball experts, with agreement rates of between 0.87 and 0.92. As in Souchon et al. (2010) , both observers recorded players' transgressions, referees' decisions and type of situations. One single measure for each variable was averaged.
Analytic strategy and statistical analysis
Number of situations was analyzed by way of a 3 (competition level) X 3 (situation type: immediate intervention, unsuccessful advantage, successful advantage) factorial ANOVA, as was the hypothesis that players' competition level would influence the prevalence of immediate intervention situations (i.e., number of immediate intervention situations divided by total number of situations). The hypothesis that competition level would influence the application of sporting sanctions in unsuccessful and successful situations was tested using a 3 (competition level) X 2 (successful vs. unsuccessful advantage situations) X 3 (sanction type: 9-meter throw vs. 7-meter throw vs. no punishment) factorial ANOVA.
Concerning disciplinary decisions, "failure situations" were defined following Souchon et al. (2010) as immediate intervention situations pooled with unsuccessful advantage situations. The hypothesis that referees' disciplinary sanctions in successful and failure situations would be influenced by competition level was tested using a 2 (success vs. 
Content analysis of referees' explanations for competition-level effects on decisions.
The findings described above were then used as a basis for questions posed to the 100 referees who participated in the second part of the study. Specifically, they were asked (1) why players display more transgressions toward attacking players in possession when the competition level rises, while referees intervene less frequently with sporting decisions; (2) why referees punish players more severely with disciplinary punishment at the highest than at the lowest levels; (3) why the proportion of immediate intervention situations is greater in the lowest than in the highest level in reference to the number of defensive transgression committed; and (4) Table 4 depicts the percentage of referees who stated at least one of the most common explanations (i.e., performance, aggressiveness, subjective explanation and refereeing characteristic).
Results revealed that referees frequently expressed the stereotype that highest-level players would be more skillful and would perform better than lowest-level players. Also, referees tended to expect that highest-level players would be more aggressive than lowestlevel players. Interestingly, more than half of referees suggested that they would be more benevolent (i.e., more readily return the ball to the victim of a foul after a missed pass or shot) with low-than high-level players. Thirty-nine percent of referees also mentioned the influence of refereeing skill in order to understand the competition-level effects. Notably, this was evoked as an explanation much less than were explanations based on player competence
Discussion
The aims of the present research were to test the effect of competition level on referees' decisions in handball, and to examine the extent to which referees invoke stereotypic beliefs about player competence in order to explain these effects. We expected that for both sporting and disciplinary sanctions, referees would intervene less with higher-level players than with lower-level players. Results were consistent with this prediction for sporting sanctions, but not for disciplinary sanctions. Referees tended to apply fewer sporting sanctions to highest-level players than lowest-level players, but punished highest-level players more severely with disciplinary sanctions than lowest-level players. In turn, competition level effects as expected occurred only in immediate intervention situations and unsuccessful situations, but not in successful situations. Overall, these findings greatly extend prior evidence that competition level may influence referees' decisions (Souchon et al., 2009 ) and previous studies on judgmental heuristics in refereeing (e.g., Unkelbach & Memmert, 2010) .
Concerning sporting sanctions, referees as predicted intervened immediately more frequently with lowest-than with highest-level players, and were more likely in unsuccessful situations to award a 9-meter throw to lowest-level players than to intermediate-level players, and returned the ball more frequently to intermediate-level players than to highest-level players (see Souchon et al., 2010 for similar effects related to player gender). Different processes may explain these effects. For example, the high speed of play at a high level of competition may make a higher proportion of fouls more ambiguous (e.g., MacMahon, Starkes, & Deakin, 2007) , while higher-player aggressiveness overall may make it more difficult to notice each transgression (Mascarenhas, O'Hare, & Plessner, 2006) . Referees may also consciously or unconsciously adjust their decisions in order to only sanction the defensive transgressions that surpass a certain level of intensity (Unkelbach & Memmert, 2008) . In addition, the relatively high level of stress due to pressure from players (e.g., Kaissidis-Rodafinos, Anshel, & Sideridis, 1998) and from supporters (e.g., Nevill et al., 2002) at the highest competition level may impact upon referees' decisions in a manner that maintains the 'flow' of the game, and its value as a spectacle (e.g., Mascarenhas et al., 2006) .
Nevertheless, the fewer sporting sanctions at the highest levels of play are consistent both with the idea that referees may wait longer before intervening at a high level of competition because they could expect that players can prolong their actions, despite the gravity of the fouls (Souchon et al., 2009) , and with predictions derived from the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) . Specifically, analysis of referees' explanations for the effects of competition level described above revealed that the most common forms of explanation invoked were related to beliefs about player competence (e.g., the inability of lower-level players to gain from playing an advantage; the ability of higher-level players to resist fouls), the greater aggression of higher-level players (i.e., low warmth), and the need for benevolent intervention at lower levels. The SCM would predict more benevolence towards members of low-status groups (low-level players in this case), on the basis that they are less competent but warmer (e.g., less aggressive), than their high-status (high playing level) counterparts (Cuddy et al., 2008) . These were all invoked more frequently than beliefs about referees' own ability at different competition levels. As characterizations of player competence, they thus logically serve to justify as well as explain the competition-level effects (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990) , in keeping with theories of the social functions of stereotypic beliefs (e.g., Tajfel, 1981) .
Concerning disciplinary sanctions, the results contradicted our predictions and the findings of Souchon et al. (2009) , but were consistent with results obtained by Debanne and Fontayne (in press ). Referees in "failure situations" tended to punish higher-level players more severely than lower-level players. Specifically, the greater intensity of contact between attacking and defensive players at this level could justify more severe punishment of the defensive player with a disciplinary sanction. Analysis of referees' explanations revealed that this may be subjectively explained in terms of the greater risk posed to attacking players at this level. Nevertheless, referees may react more leniently to lower-levels players as they would perceive them to be less competent and warmer than higher-levels players (Fiske et al., 2002) .
In terms of the wider applicability of the present findings, models such as the SCM have predictions relating directly to behavior, but these have generally not been directly tested, with research tending to focus on perceptions, attitudes and emotions as outcomes. In contrast, the present research directly assesses the naturally-occurring behavior of a powerful group who are directly adjudicating upon, and intervening in, the activities of others. In turn, the study reveals important nuances in terms of how perceived competence and warmth may shape such behavior. Specifically, the finding that referees apply fewer sporting sanctions, but more disciplinary sanctions to relatively high-level players suggests that rather than being a simple matter of more or less intervention/punishment per se, actions aimed at regulating the behavior of outgroups may be taken more frequently, but with less severity for low competence/high warmth groups, whereas actions aimed at regulating the behavior of outgroups may be taken less frequently, but with more severity for high competence/low warmth groups.
Limitations and future research
Limitations of the present research include the fact that different referees officiate at different competition levels, while officiating alone or as pairs depending on competition levels. Also, because of the naturalistic observations, we were unable to test directly the effect of stereotyping (or other processes) on referees' decision making. (Souchon et al., 2013) would be that referees at all levels level of expertise -even the most experienced -would be influenced by their stereotype related to competition level.
Future research could also examine how referees' decisions may be related to referees' implicit cognition, for example by using an implicit association task (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to explore the role of implicit and explicit competition level stereotypes and the role of implicit and explicit attitudes toward higher vs. lower-level players. Implicit and explicit measures are better predictors of behaviors together than in isolation, especially when the correlation between implicit and explicit measures is high (see Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009 ), as we would expect to be the case here. Table 3 Means ( 
